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C2
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- 1 -

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

MOSCOW PROPAGANDA ON CUBA STRESSES EFFICACY OF NEGOTIATIONS

Optimism in regard to East-West relations and self-congratulation over the "success" of the USSR's "peaceful coexistence" policy pervades Moscow's comment on the Cuban situation. Declaring that the fruitfulness of negotiations based on mutual concessions has been demonstrated, propagandists stress that the two sides must now "immediately tackle" other problems.

There are demands, at the same time, that the United States quickly "seal its pledge" not to invade Cuba. Moscow implies that formalization of the U.S. pledge is the primary if not sole purpose of the consultations at the United Nations in New York. Moscow now acknowledges, belatedly, that international inspection is at issue, but suppresses Soviet responsibility in the matter by referring to "concessions by the Fidel Castro government."

Soviet-Cuban friendship continues to be emphasized, particularly in broadcasts to Cuba. Mikoyan pledged "brotherly" bloc support to Cuba in his 25 November farewell speech in Havana. But he told the Cubans their best guarantee against attack was unity behind their government; international guarantees, he said, were "also important," given the fact of bloc support for Cuba. Soviet commentators, echoing Mikoyan's remarks in New York on the 27th, express "support" of the Cuban Government's 26 November statement demanding inspection of "mercenary" centers in return for inspection in Cuba. But in reporting the Cuban statement TASS toned it down considerably, leaving out the lengthy accusations against the United States and singling out passages on mutual concessions and the prospects for settling other international issues once there is a "fair and satisfactory solution" in Cuba.

Settlement "Proved" Possibility of "Abolishing War from Society"

The 20 November announcement of the USSR's decision to remove the 11-28 bombers from Cuba and the resultant ending of the U.S. naval quarantine signaled a new surge of propaganda endorsements of "peaceful coexistence" and references to the demonstrated value of "reasonable compromise." A typical commentary by Viktorov, widely broadcast by Moscow on 22 November, states that "the crisis in the Caribbean Sea has been ended" and that

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

"catastrophe was avoided because a sensible compromise was achieved. Mutual concessions made possible a mutually acceptable solution." Only peaceful coexistence, Viktorov says, can guarantee a stable and lasting peace; "the principle of peaceful coexistence is the only same principle for international relations."

A number of Moscow commentators cite the Cuban settlement as proof of the correctness of the 20th CPSU Congress thesis that wars are no longer fatalistically inevitable. Viktorov goes beyond this to invoke--indirectly--the controversial 21st congress thesis on the possibility of excluding war. The Cuban affair, he says, showed that it was possible to save the world from nuclear catastrophe and "abolish war from human society."

Addressing North American audiences, commentator Afonin lauds the means by which the United States and the Soviet Union "found a sensible way out of their conflict." Afonin gives credit to both sides: The Soviet Government "showed courage and restraint," and the United States "showed that it had leaders who appraised the situation soberly and realized what the consequences of nuclear war would be."

Kuusinen at the Hungarian party congress on 21 November--defending the Soviet actions ostensibly in response to "Albanian leaders," but with GPP criticism clearly in mind--asserted that Soviet moves to prevent war over Cuba were taken with the knowledge that "responsible figures in the United States" understand the present balance of forces and the consequences of thermonuclear war. Khrushchev, he said, "finally succeeded in achieving a reasonable compromise." Introducing a line not previously used by Soviet spokesmen, Kuusinen told the congress that "the most reckless supporters of military adventure in the United States hoped they could succeed in provoking us to act rashly to obtain the desired pretext to unleash a nuclear war, but they miscalculated." By "agreeing to mutual compromise," Khrushchev "defended Cuba's independence and warded off nuclear war."

PEOPLE'S DAILY responded editorially on 27 November that it was "the Cuban peoples' firm and unyielding fighting will" that deterred the "U.S. imperialists" from invading Cuba. "There can be no other reason," the paper said, in clear rebuttal to the claim that it was Khrushchev's actions which saved the situation. PEOPLE'S DAILY's polemical editorial seemed directly responsive to other elements in Kuusinen's speech, which contained a pointed reference to "ultra-leftwing fault-finders" who "throw around pseudorevolutionary phrases and irresponsible charges of capitulation" though they are unable to give Cuba "the slightest practical support." Kuusinen's charge and the Chinese countercharge are covered in the Bloc Relations section of this SURVEY.

- 3 -

U.S. No-Invasion Pledge Must Be "Put on Paper"

Viktorov's 22 November statement that "the crisis has been ended" is qualified in other Moscow comment warning that diplomats cannot consider the conflict completely over until the United States provides a formal guarantee that it will not invade Cuba. Several commentators echo Polyakov's statement, in the 24 November IZVESTIYA, that this guarantee must be "put on paper" in order to "seal the pledge of the United States to relieve Cuba of the threat of invasion." A Kondrashov TASS dispatch says the exacting of such a guarantee, "duly formulated and confirmed," is now "the most important item" on the Cuban agenda. In support of these demands, Moscow argues that President Kennedy has already given assurances against an invasion of Cuba--both in messages to Khrushchev and in his 20 November press conference--and that a no-invasion pledge is part and parcel of the U.S. agreement to lift the quarantine. Kondrashov declares that Washington, "having said 'A' [lifted the quarantine], must now say 'B' [provide a nonaggression guarantee]."

It is in the context of these demands that Moscow breaks its long silence on the substance of the New York negotiations. Now acknowledging that the New York talks have been in progress, commentators imply that their purpose is to get the U.S. pledge formalized. Zayvalov, in a commentators' roundtable discussion on 25 November, remarks vaguely that there are consultations in New York on "the subject" of the U.S.-Soviet agreements; Polyakov writes in IZVESTIYA that the U.S. no-invasion pledge is "the subject of the talks in New York."

Inspection Pictured As Issue Among U.S., U.N., Cuba

Prior to the 26 November Cuban Government statement and Mikoyan's endorsement of the Cuban demands in New York on the following day, Soviet propaganda had carefully obscured the issue of international inspection to verify the removal of offensive weapons and assure against their reintroduction. The issue had been broached only occasionally--and disparagingly--in comment conveying the idea that inspection demands were being raised unofficially by "aggressive circles" in the United States who did not want a settlement.

Now, in endorsing the Cuban Government's demand for inspection of anti-Castro "mercenary" centers in exchange for international inspection in Cuba, Moscow implies that this is a question to be settled among the United States, the United Nations, and Cuba. A TASS report of Mikoyan's 27 November statement in New York quotes him as mentioning only "Cuba's attitude toward inspection," and as saying that the Cuban demands for reciprocal inspection "are fair and we support them." A widely broadcast Zakharov commentary on the same day implies that the United States has

- 4 -

introduced a new problem in requiring inspection: "Now Washington insists on inspection in Cuba." Zakharov says that "this problem, too, can be solved if the interests of the parties concerned are mutually respected." He goes on to cite Cuba's "just claims" in this regard.

A 23 November commentary, in keeping with Moscow's stance of detachment on the issue, notes that a promise not to invade Cuba "is made conditional" in the United States "on a number of concessions by the Fidel Castro government...on allowing inspection of Cuban territory." This talk, broadcast only to Soviet listeners, explains that such inspection is "a delicate matter" which "infringes" on national sovereignty. Peking's view of inspection is made clear in the 27 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial's comment that following the withdrawal of the weapons "the insatiable Kennedy administration raised still more presumptuous demands, claiming the prerogative of encroachment" on Cuban soil in order to "humiliate and injure revolutionary Cuba." The context of the comment is the Chinese argument that appeasement of imperialism only encourages more aggression.)

Moscow has largely ignored the question of continued U.S. air surveillance of Cuba. Polyanov in IZVESTIYA on 21 November, however, charges U.S. "extremists" with urging "legalization of the violation of Cuba's airspace by American aircraft"--an "absolutely intolerable practice."

Continued Stress on Soviet Friendship, Solidarity With Cuba

Commentaries beamed to Cuba, comprising a third of Moscow's output on the Cuban situation, continue to feature assurances of Soviet-Cuban friendship and solidarity. This was the major theme of Mikoyan's farewell address to the Cuban people in Havana on 25 November. But while playing up "brotherly" bloc support, Mikoyan told the Cubans that their "greatest guarantee" against an attack was their own "unity", "international guarantees against aggression," buttressed by the fact that bloc countries "are standing with you, hand in hand, like brothers," were "also important." Mikoyan declared that "shoulder to shoulder with your government, we have removed the hand of war from Cuba and freed mankind of the threat of nuclear war." He hailed the USSR's "wisdom of policy" in achieving a peaceful settlement. And in tacit recognition of Castro's reaction to the Soviet moves, he told the Cubans that future historians "will make an objective and just appraisal" of Khrushchev's action in the crisis.

Soviet media have not commented on the substance or outcome of Mikoyan's conferences in Havana. Mikoyan observed in New York only that he was "very pleased" with the visit and that "the leaders of the Cuban Government told me that they too are satisfied." Soviet broadcasts have referred to his discussion of "the international situation" with the Cuban leaders.

- 5 -

Moscow's handling of the 26 November Cuban statement was in keeping with the generally conciliatory tenor of the propaganda. A brief TASS summary ignored entirely the lengthy accusations against the United States which made up the bulk of the statement and left out the assertion that "Cuba reserves the right to acquire arms of any type for its defense and to take steps it deems pertinent to strengthening its security." TASS singled out passages, instead, on the importance of "mutual concessions and guarantees" and on the prospects for settling other problems once there is "a fair and satisfactory solution of this crisis."

A 21 November Moscow commentary beamed exclusively and repeatedly to Latin America strikes an atypical note of bravado and anti-U.S. denunciation, stating that the "reactionary forces that dragged the world to the brink of devastating conflict have been defeated; the forces of peace have been victorious." The commentator repeats the standard line that the outcome of the crisis was "first and foremost" a triumph for the Soviet "peace policy," but he goes on--in an apparent attempt to bolster Cuban prestige on the continent--to give an unusually large measure of credit to the Cuban people and their government. The Cubans, he says, scored a "great victory," and "there is no doubt that it was only the Cuban people's decision to carry out a life or death resistance...that prevented the extremely bellicose circles in the United States from taking the final fatal step." The commentator then sets out to establish the claim that Latin America solidly supported Cuba during the crisis. Citing a number of pro-Cuban demonstrations in the hemisphere, he asserts that "never has there been in Latin America a movement as powerful, universal, and combatant as the movement in solidarity with Cuba."

- 6 -

DISARMAMENT: CUBAN CRISIS DEMONSTRATES NEED FOR SPEEDY SETTLEMENT

Resumption of the 18-nation Geneva conference on 26 November occasions only a moderate increase in Moscow's attention to the disarmament and test-ban issues, which has remained at a low level since the recess of the conference on 7 September. Soviet spokesmen repeatedly cite the near disaster of the Cuban crisis as dramatic evidence of the urgency of a disarmament agreement. Declaring that the Cuban settlement demonstrated the value of approaching East-West problems in a spirit of compromise and mutual concessions, propagandists make clear that the next move in disarmament is up to the West. Gromyko's 21 September modification of the Soviet proposal for the destruction of all nuclear carriers in the first stage of general disarmament is repeatedly cited as evidence of Soviet readiness to compromise, and commentators complain that no similar concession has come from the West.

Despite repeated assertions that the positions of East and West on the test-ban question "are not far apart," Soviet spokesmen continue to reject Western demands for on-site inspection to detect underground tests. At the same time, the British decision to conduct an underground nuclear test in Nevada is seen as further evidence that the West is deliberately blocking an agreement in order to continue the arms race. Other partial disarmament measures receive only sporadic attention, although Tsarapkin remarked at the resumed Geneva sessions that such measures constitute one of the "main questions" to be dealt with at the conference.

Moscow Stresses Soviet "Compromises" in General Disarmament

Assertions that a disarmament agreement must be reached in order to save mankind from a thermonuclear catastrophe include that by Kuusinen in his 21 November speech at the Hungarian party congress. Following his polemical defense of Soviet agreement to "mutual compromise" in the Cuban question, Kuusinen declared that "disarmament is the imperious demand of our epoch," and that only disarmament can insure a truly stable, peaceful coexistence. Declaring that the "imperialists" are creating various obstacles to implementation of general disarmament, Kuusinen said that the USSR is ready to discuss "any constructive proposals" which would